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Monographs  of  the  U.  S.  Infantry  Society. 


NO.  3. 


OUR  ARMY. 


The  Necessity  of  a  Well  Organized  and  Trained  Infantry 

at  the  Outbreak  of  War,  and  the  Best  Means 

to  be  Adopted  by  the  United  States 

for  Obtaining  such  a  Force. 


BY 

SECOND  LIEUTENANT  J.  G.  H ARBOR D, 

Fifth   U    S.  Cavalry. 
£f  TBB^^ 

HRSlTT 


PRIZK  ESSAY  KOR  1897. 


BOARD  OF  AWARD: 

Senator  J.  R.  HAWLEY,     General  HORACE  PORTER, 
JOHN  C.  ROPES. 


Monographs  of  the  U.  S.  Infantry  Society. 


NO.  3. 


OUR  ARMY. 


The  Necessity  of  a  Well  Organized  and  Trained  Infantry 

at  the  Outbreak  of  War,  and  the  Best  Means 

to  be  Adopted  by  the  United  States 

for  Obtaining  such  a  Force. 


BY 

SECOND  LIEUTENANT  J.  G.  HARBORD, 

Fifth   U.  S.  Cavalry. 


PRIZK  ESSAY  KOR  1897. 


BOARD  OF  AWARD: 

Senator  J.  R.  HAWLEY,     General  HORACE  PORTER, 
JOHN  C.  ROPES. 


GIFT 


prise  Esea^  of  flnfantrp  Society 

THE  NECESSITY  OF  A  WELL  ORGANIZED  AND 
TRAINED  INFANTRY  AT  THE  OUTBREAK  OF 
WAR,  AND  THE  BEST  MEANS  TO  BE  ADOPTED 
BY  THE  UNITED  STATES  FOR  OBTAINING  SUCH 
A  FORCE. 

BY  LIEUT.  J.  G.  HARBORD,  STH  U.  S.  CAVALRY. 


There  is  a  rank  due  the  United  States  among  Nations  which  will  be  with- 
held, if  not  absolutely  lost  by  a  reputation  for  weakness.  If  we  desire  peace, 
one  of  the  most  powerful  instruments  in  our  rising  prosperity,  it  must  be 
known  that  we  are  at  all  times  ready  for  war.  —  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

However  pacific  the  general  policy  of  a  nation  may  be  it  ought  never  to 
be  without  an  adequate  stock  of  military  knowledge  for  emergencies. 

—  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

TO  maintain  a  large  standing  army  has  always  been  con- 
trary to  the  settled  policy  of  our  nation,  which  has  cre- 
ated armies  when  the  necessity  for  them  has  arisen. 
And  yet  all  history  teaches  that  permanent  military  establish- 
ments can  be  safely  dispensed  with  only  at  the  dawn  of  that  far- 
off  day  when  "  Nation  shall  not  lift  tip  sword  against  nation, 
neither  shall  they  learn  war  any  more."  So  long  as  the  passions 
of  men  remain  the  same,  wars  will  be  waged.  Years  without 
war  may  soothe  some  minds  into  a  kindly  belief  in  universal 
peace  ;  a  growing  faith  in  that  phantom  Arbitration  ;  the  reso- 
lutions of  Peace  Congresses.  Our  traditional  policy  of  non-in- 
terference and  our  position  with  the  ocean  between  us  and  any 
European  foe,  may  easily  lull  our  nation  into  a  neglect  of  war- 
like preparation,  and  the  decadence  of  our  military  spirit.  Ma- 
terial prosperity  ;  devotion  to  the  arts  and  industries  of  a  long 
peace  ;  conquests  in  the  world  of  commerce  and  invention  have 
perhaps  blinded  our  eyes  to  our  duty  and  destiny  on  the  West- 
ern Continent.  Surely  the  United  States  is  fated  to  some  day 
overshadow  and  dominate  all  other  states  on  this  hemisphere. 
The  instinct  of  conquest  is  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  blood  and  long 

328008 


4  A ''WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY. 

before  our  population  is  as  dense  and  the  ownership  of  arable 
land,  as  difficult  of  attainment  as  in  the  best  part  of  Europe  to- 
day, our  people  will  clamor  for  the  extension  of  our  borders,  and 
the  Latin-American  with  his  indolence  and  improvidence  will 
give  way  before  the  energetic  and  resourceful  Anglo-Saxon 
American.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  become  a  tenet  of  the 
National  Creed,  and  at  no  distant  day  the  possession  of  Cuba 
and  the  adjacent  isles  will  be  essential  to  the  protection  of  our 
interests  in  the  canal  across  the  Isthmus.  The  very  possession 
of  over  17,000  miles  of  frontier  (not  including  Alaska)  is  a  men- 
ace to  permanent  peace.  Even  without  facing  one  of  these  con- 
tingencies, each  of  which  might  mean  war,  there  is  no  better 
index  to  the  future  than  the  history  of  the  past.  From  first  to 
last  over  a  million  men  have  given  up  life  or  limb  for  the  flag. 
Since  Waterloo  no  other  nation  has  had  as  much  war  as  the 
United  States.  Every  generation  since  our  Independence  has 
had  its  war.  More  lives  were  offered  up  on  the  bloody  fields  of 
our  Civil  War  than  have  been  lost  in  British  battles  since 
Harold  died  at  Hastings.  Over  ten  per  cent,  of  the  past  ninety- 
six  years  has  seen  us  at  war.  Nor  does  this  include  that 
anomaly  of  war  in  peace,  Indian  trouble,  in  which,  for  example, 
from  1866  to  1891  inclusive,  874  engagements  were  fought  with 
Indians.  The  sieges  and  battles  of  the  United  States  are 
counted  by  scores  and  its  minor  combats  by  thousands. 

u  Military  virtue  is  not  the  growth  of  a  day,  nor  is  there  any 
nation  so  rich  and  populous,  that  despising  it  can  rest  secure." 
A  similarity  marks  the  beginning  of  all  wars  in  which  the 
United  States  has  engaged.  At  the  outset  of  the  War  of  1812, 
many  posts  for  want  of  orders  or  timely  reinforcements  fell  into 
hostile  hands.  A  generation  later,  in  1846,  the  country  was 
even  less  prepared  for  hostilities.  When  General  Taylor  was 
ordered  to  the  southern  frontier  in  the  autumn  of  1845,  the 
army  was  numerically  less  than  it  had  been  since  1808.  In 
1 86 1  the  country  was  as  unready  for  conflict  as  a  treasonable  ad- 
ministration of  the  War  Department  could  render  it.  Could 
President  Lincoln  have  put  forty  thousand  trained  soldiers  into 
the  field  at  once,  the  incipient  rebellion  would  have  been 
crushed  promptly  and  sufficient  money  and  property  have  been 
saved  to  pay  the  expenses  of  an  army  of  50,000  men  for  three 


A    WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY.  5 

centuries,  not  to  speak  of  the  thousands  of  devoted  lives  that 
would  have  been  preserved  to  the  Republic.  For  many  a  year 
the  idea  has  prevailed  that  the  country  is  full  of  trained  men. 
And  so  it  was.  Until  recently  the  majority  of  the  officers  in 
our  regular  army  had  received  during  the  Civil  War  practical 
experience  in  campaigning  and  fighting  that  would  have 
proved  invaluable  had  another  war  occurred  during  the  prime 
and  vigor  of  their  manhood.  But  a  proclamation  will  no  longer 
bring  trained  and  dis  iplined  armies  into  the  field.  Over  thirty 
years  have  passed.  Only  20  per  cent,  of  our  present  line  officers 
saw  service  then.  The  youngest  infantry  officer  with  any  war 
record  is  forty-six  years  old  and  his  enlistment  was  after  Lee 
surrendered.  All  the  grades  above  captain  are  of  these  men. 
And  many  officers  who  entered  the  service  after  the  war  are 
older  than  some  who  fought  in  it.  There  are  but  ten  infantry 
officers  who  saw  war  service  who  are  under  fifty  years  of  age. 
And  in  civil  life  the  veterans  who  yearly  clamor  at  re-unions  for 
the  glory  of  having  been  the  youngest  soldier  of  the  Grand  Army 
are  grey-haired  men.  The  reserve  of  men  trained  in  the  Civil 
War  which  for  years  relieved  us  of  the  necessity  of  making 
special  preparation  for  war,  is  well-nigh  gone.  The  chief  mili- 
tary strength  of  every  nation  lies  in  its  citizens  between  twenty 
and  thirty  years  old.  A  generation  born  since  our  last  war 
must  fight  the  next  one.  The  great  mass  of  those  upon  whom 
the  country  depends  to-day  is  as  untrained  as  the  raw  troops  that 
fought  the  first  battles  of  the  Rebellion.  Knowledge  of  the 
military  art,  like  that  of  any  other,  is  lost  through  disiise. 

The  United  States  is  rich  in  brains,  mechanical  industries 
and  inventive  genius  and  her  citizens  are  unexcelled  in  earnest- 
ness, enthusiasm,  energy,  courage,  intelligence,  and  patriotism. 
There  is  inbred  in  them  that  quality  of  the  Anglo  Saxon  trans- 
mitted through  generations  of  free  self-governing  ancestry, 
which  has  made  that  race  always  a  conqueror.  For  this  com- 
bination when  properly  trained  and  directed  there  are  limitless 
possibilities.  But  untrained  patriotism  and  intelligence  and 
misguided  energy  and  enthusiasm  are  not  only  powerless  to 
save  the  nation  in  the  hour  of  danger  but  through  the  re-action 
following  defeat  may  intensify  disaster.  It  is  as  fallacious  and 
dangerous  to  rely  wholly  upon  the  courage,  devotion  and  re- 


6  A    WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY. 

sources  of  the  people  without  practical  preparation  as  it  is  futile 
to  depend  upon  isolated  position,  or  arbitration,  to  forever  pro- 
tect us  from  war.  Bull  Run,  Ball's  Bluff,  Big  Bethel  and  a 
dozen  other  defeats  tell  that  lack  of  preparation  means  disgrace 
and  disaster.  Nor  is  this  lesson  peculiar  to  our  own  history. 
"  The  plainest  lessons  of  the  Franco-German  and  China-Japan- 
ese wars  are  that  patriotism  and  numbers  are  as  nothing  unless 
the  patriotism  has  beforehand  prepared  the  numbers  for  the 
emergency."  The  first  principle  of  self-preservation  in  our  day 
demands  that  we  should  be  ready  to  meet  sudden  attacks,  for  in 
this  age  of  electricity  and  steam  the  declaration  of  war  and  the 
mobilization  of  armies  and  fleets  are  ordered  together.  Our  raw 
troops  will  probably  never  again  be  called  upon  to  face  equally 
untrained  men  as  was  the  case  in  1861.  The  armies  and  fleets 
of  even  second-rate  foreign  powers  are  better  prepared  for  war 
to-day  in  numbers,  command,  discipline  and  facilities  for  mobili- 
zation, than  ever  before.  Should  the  next  time  our  troops  face 
fire  be  in  meeting  one  of  these,  the  period  we  should  have  for 
preparation  would  be  the  time  required  to  cross  the  intervening 
space,  for  war  declared  to-day,  they  could  march  to-morrow.* 

The  theory  of  preparing  when  dangers  threaten  is  no  longer  a 
tenable  one  and  even  in  the  old  days  when  it  was  possible, 
armies  so  raised  always  lacked  the  instruction  and  discipline 
that  can  only  be  acquired  by  untiring  drill  and  study,  and  time 
for  the  formation  of  the  military  habit.  To  emphasize  the  wis- 
dom of  preparing  for  war,  in  organization  and  training  savors 
of  proving  an  axiom.  Surely  prudence  demands  practical  pre- 
paration in  every  line  consistent  with  the  genius  of  our  peculiar 
institutions. 

Since  the  Swiss  infantry  triumphed  over  the  Burgundian 
Chivalry  at  Granson,  Morat  and  Nancy,  when  first  the  superiority 
of  good  infantry  over  the  best  cavalry  of  those  days,  was  shown, 
the  infantry  has  maintained  its  place  as  the  solid  mainstay  and 
backbone  of  all  armies.  In  the  earliest  German  and  Frank 
armies  the  principal  arm  was  infantry  acting  with  cavalry  ; 
afterwards  degenerating  into  mere  attendants  of  the  latter. 
These  Swiss  victories  restored  the  infantry  to  its  ancient  place 
and  it  has  not  since  lost  it.  Naturally,  for  us,  preparation  for 

*  See  Appendix  A. 


A   WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY.  7 

war  means  largely  preparation  in  infantry,  not  only  as  most 
important,  but  as  better  within  our  capabilities  in  the  direction 
of  rapid  and  cheap  training.  Any  war  maintained  by  volun- 
teers, militia,  or  a  general  levy  inevitably  bring  into  the  field  a 
numerous  infantry.  It  can  be  made  ready  for  war  more  cheaply 
and  quickly  than  any  other  arm,  and,  strength  in  infantry  com- 
bined with  skill  in  command  may  in  a  measure  compensate  for 
a  lack  in  the  other  two  arms.  The  Germans,  confessedly,  till 
the  next  war  at  least,  the  foremost  military  nation,  say  an  infan- 
try soldier  can  be  prepared  for  defensive  war  in  one  and  for 
offensive  war  in  two  years.  Such  time  is  not  at  all  adequate  for 
the  making  of  the  cavalry  or  artillery.  Because  of  this  greater 
comparative  quickness  in  preparation  the  peace  establishment 
of  infantry  is  by  common  usage  kept  proportionately  lower  than 
the  other  arms.  Its  very  susceptibility  for  quick  efficiency 
results  to  its  own  disadvantage  in  that  respect.  Again,  the  gen- 
eral stock  of  military  knowledge  existing  among  civilians  is 
more  readily  utilized  in  infantry  than  other  branches.  The 
infantry  composes  the  mass  of  all  armies  and  the  action  of  other 
arms  must  be  subordinated  to  it.  With  its  fire  more  decisive 
and  deadly  than  that  of  artillery,  it  is  the  army  when  drawn  up 
before  the  enemy ;  fighting  by  infantry  seems  in  order  almost 
any  time  within  range,  and  always  some  time  during  the  battle, 
while  the  opportunity  to  employ  cavalry  may  not  come.  Its 
action  is  prolonged  under  exposure  while  the  cavalry  charge  is 
over  in  a  moment.  It  is  aptly  said  that  while  cavalry  are  counted 
by  horses  and  artillery  by  guns,  in  infantry  the  human  alone  is 
taken  into  account,  and  as  more  responsive  to  training  and  to 
personal  influences  its  nature  opens  up  greater  possibilities  both 
in  training  and  use  than  other  arms.  Perhaps  the  case  for  the 
infantry  has  been  by  no  one  more  aptly  and  concisely  presented 
than  by  Major  Wagner  in  his  "Organization  and  Tactics":  "Both 
numerically  and  in  the  effects  of  its  action  the  infantry  is  the  most 
important  part  of  an  army.  It  can  operate  on  all  kind  of  ground  ; 
it  is  equally  adapted  to  offensive  or  defensive  action  and  it  can 
act  either  at  a  halt  or  in  motion.  It  is  more  easily  equipped, 
more  cheaply  maintained,  more  quickly  made  efficient  and  is 
more  nearly  independent  than  any  other  arm.  The  efficiency 
of  an  army  is  mainly  measured  by  the  efficiency  of  its  infantry, 


8  A    WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY. 

and  the  Austro-Prussian  War  of  1866  showed  that  the  deficiency 
of  infantry  cannot  be  counterbalanced  by  the  skill  and  daring  of 
the  cavalry  or  the  devoted  heroism  of  the  artillery."  General 
Sherman  once  said  before  a  committee  of  Congress  that  he 
looked  upon  two  infantry  regiments  as  worth  more  than  the 
whole  general  staff  of  our  army,  himself  included,  and  that  he 
would  rather  have  Congress  abolish  him  and  his  office  and  tear 
out  the  first  thirty-eight  pages  of  the  Army  Register  than  see  it 
disband  two  such  regiments.  "  The  infantryman  equipped  with 
the  musket  and  bayonet  constitutes  the  most  formidable  machine 
of  combat  that  man  can  imagine"  and  "on  the  battle-field  as 
infantry  gains  or  yields  ground  it  irresistibly  draws  the  other 
arms  with  it  in  advance  or  retreat."  Armies  of  to-day  are  much 
on  a  par  with  regard  to  arms,  equipments  and  munitions  of  war. 
So  too  among  civilized  nations  the  same  wars  serve  as  lessons 
for  the  military  student ;  the  same  general  ideas  as  to  leader- 
ship, strategy  and  tactics,  prevail  the  world  over.  The  victory 
then  in  future  struggles  will  follow  .organization  and  training 
unless  out-numbered.  On  the  latter  score  we  have  nothing  to 
fear.  Every  other  nation  of  any  importance  has  kept  its  organi- 
zation to  date  with  the  improvement  in  weapons.  Our  country 
has  marked  time  for  half  a  century  in  such  matters,  and  to-day 
maintains  an  infantry  organization,  born  in  the  age  of  flint 
locks,  which  would  go  down  in  the  first  engagement  with  a  civil- 
ized enemy.  Everything  seems  to  demand  that  our  organiza- 
tion be  suited  to  the  employment  of  our  excellent  arm,  that  we 
may  apply  modern  methods  to  modern  appliances.  "  A  solid 
organization  and  an  equipment  with  the  very  best  of  arms,  are 
the  indispensible  foundation  of  tactical  success  on  the  battle- 
field." No  mightier  intellect  than  John  C.  Calhoun  has  ever 
ruled  in  the  War  Department,  and  his  words  written  seventy-two 
years  ago  are  as  weighty  in  wisdom  for  his  countrymen  as 
though  the  great  southerner  spoke  to-day  :  u  It  is  only  thus  that 
we  can  be  in  the  condition  to  meet  the  first  shock  of  hostilities 
with  unyielding  firmness,  and  to  press  on  an  enemy  while  our 
resources  are  yet  unexhausted.  *  *  *  Without  such  troops  the 
two  or  three  first  campaigns  would  be  worse  than  lost.  The 
honor  of  our  arms  would  be  tarnished  and  the  resources  of  the 
country  uselessly  lavished,  for  in  proportion  to  the  want  of  effici- 


A   WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY.  9 

ency  and  a  proper  organization,  must  in  actual  service  be  our 
expenditures.  When  taught  by  sad  experience  we  would  be 
compelled  to  make  redoubled  efforts,  with  exhausted  means,  to 
regain  those  very  advantages  which  were  lost  for  the  want  of 
experience  and  skill." 

Granted  that  a  well  organized  and  trained  infantry  is  a 
necessity  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  it  is  believed  that  in  the 
future  as  in  the  past  our  dependence  must  be  on  the  regular 
army  and  volunteers,  as  such,  for  :  (i)  The  United  States  are 
never  likely  to  maintain  sufficient  regular  army  for  war  needs. 
(2)  Both  the  Constitution  and  the  jealousy  of  States  stand  as  a 
barrier  to  the  militia  ever  being  nationalized  up  to  a  standard 
and  organization  cohesive  enough  to  meet  real  war,  except  when 
actually  mustered  into  the  National  Army  as  volunteers.  It  is 
thought,  then,  that  the  best  means  for  the  United  States  to  ob- 
tain a  well  organized  and  trained  infantry  will  be  found  :  (i)  In 
such  legislation  as  will  give  the  regular  infantry  a  modern 
organization  and  provide  for  its  immediate  expansion  at  the  out- 
break of  war,  and  such  training  in  peace  as  will  make  it  a  model 
of  efficiency.  (2)  In  such  legislation  and  aid  to  the  militia  as 
will  remedy  its  present  defects,  and  make  it  as  nearly  as  possible 
uniform  in  organization  and  training  with  the  regular  service, 
that  when  its  organizations  are  mustered  into  the  National  Army 
it  will  be  as  volunteers  already  trained.  (3)  In  some  combina- 
tion of  regulars  and  militia  in  systematic  instruction. 

THE  REGULAR  INFANTRY  ORGANIZATION. 

One  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  organization  is  to  have 
the  military  grouped  during  peace  in  the  same  manner  as  in 
time  of  war. — Derrecagaix. 

In  organization  and  administration  it  is  indispensable  that  the 
first  place  be  given  to  the  system  and  method  that  will  make  the 
army  most  efficient  as  a  body  of  fighting  men,  that  the  essential 
functions  of  supply,  equipment  and  administration  that  require 
the  commercial  virtues,  honesty  and  industry  but  not  great  mili- 
tary capacity,  take  their  proper  place  as  subordinate  members, 
not  usurp  those  of  the  directing  head  of  the  body,  the  army ; 
that  the  ability  to  organize,  care  for,  discipline,  command  and 
fight  troops  be  sought  for,  cultivated  and  rewarded. — General 
Miles  in  1876. 


io  A   WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY. 

Experience  has  shown  that  a  regiment  of  ten  companies  in 
a  single  battalion  cannot  be  handled  effectively. — General 
McClellan. 

.The  ten  company  organization  is  awkward  in  practice  and  I 
am  satisfied  the  infantry  regiment  should  have  the  same  iden- 
tical organization  as  exists  for  the  cavalry  and  artillery,  viz. :  1 2 
companies  so  as  to  be  susceptible  of  division  into  three  battal- 
ions of  four  companies  each.  *  *  *  Three  such  regiments 
would  compose  a  brigade,  three  brigades  a  division,  and  three 
divisions  a  corps. — General  Sherman's  Memoirs. 

As  before  stated  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States  will 
never  be  a  large  one,  but  it  is  the  repository  of  the  military 
usages,  and  the  guardian  of  the  soldierly  traditions  of  our 
nation.  It  is  to  preserve  and  keep  pace  with  the  constant 
changes  in  the  art  of  war,  and  it  is  the  great  fountain  from 
which  our  militia — sometime  volunteers — are  to  draw  the 
knowledge,  skill  and  morale  which  at  the  time  of  the  country's 
peril  will  make  them  its  saviours.  In  organization  it  should  be  a 
type  and  in  efficiency  a  model.  The  organization  must  be  in 
harmony  with  the  spirit  of  our  institutions,  justified  by  our  own 
history,  and  suited  to  the  changes  time  has  wrought  in  arms 
and  projectiles,  not  forgetting  that  much  of  the  best  in  the 
modern  science  of  war  has  been  evolved  from  American  experi- 
ence. The  best  organization  for  our  infantry  on  a  peace  estab- 
lishment, having  always  possible  war  in  view,  would  be  that  in 
which  the  enlisted  strength  was  the  minimum  indispensable  for 
peace  duty  and  the  development  of  its  efficiency,  with  such  a 
proportion  of  officers  as  would  be  required  at  the  outbreak  of 
war  for  the  augmented  and  war  strength  of  companies  and  regi- 
ments. A  basic  principle  should  be  that  u  at  the  commence- 
ment of  hostilities  there  should  be  nothing  in  organization 
to  either  new  model  or  create  "  (Calhoun) ;  the  difference  be- 
tween the  war  and  peace  formation  being  only  in  the  greater 
size  of  the  former,  and  the  transition  from  peace  to  war 
being  only  an  augmentation  for  the  latter  state.  It  is 
thought,  then,  primarily,  that  an  expensive  system  of  organi- 
zation for  the  infantry  is  imperative  to  the  interests  of  the 
country.  Active  companies  should  be  maintained  on  a  peace 
footing  to  be  a  large  fraction  of  their  war  strength,  and  the 


A   WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY.  n 

number  of  regiments  to  be  such  that  in  general  perhaps  only 
two-thirds  of  the  companies  and  battalions  should  be  or- 
ganized, except  in  commissioned  strength.  Any  ordinary  emer- 
gency might  then  be  met  by  simply  filling  up  skeleton  com- 
panies, and  raising  the  strength  of  others,  uniting  recruits  in 
sub-organizations  with  disciplined  soldiers,  the  skill  and  dis- 
cipline previously  acquired  by  the  older  soldiers  being  readily 
imparted  to  the  younger. 

The  question  that  presents  itself  when  the  size  of  the  army 
is  mentioned,  or  changes  in  it  suggested,  is  the  one,  which  prop- 
erly enough  seems  always  to  the  fore  in  the  American  legisla- 
tor's brain — that  is,  cost.  It  is  believed  that  the  numbers  of  the 
army  should  bear  a  constant  ratio  to  our  ever-increasing  popula- 
tion ;  that  if  of  the  proper  size  twenty  years  ago,  it  is  too* 
small  now  ;  and  its  strength  should  be  measiired  by  the  limit 
which  Congress  judges  the  people  able  and  willing  to  pay  in  the 
way  of  insurance  by  military  proficiency  and  preparation,  against 
heavy  loss  in  case  of  war. 

Organization  is  tactical  and  administrative,  the  one  relating 
to  fighting,  the  other  to  the  maintenance  of  the  soldier  in  peace 
and  war.  The  units  are  companies,  battalions,  regiments,  etc. 
The  best  unit  is  one  that  combines  both  tactical  and  adminis- 
trative uses.  The  field  of  battle  being  the  great  final  object  of 
all  things  military,  when  tactical  and  administrative  consider- 
ations conflict,  the  latter  must  give  way.  Organization  for  the 
field  should  depend  :  (i)  on  the  range  and  penetration  of  pro- 
jectiles, and  the  accuracy  and  rapidity  of  fire  as  determining  the 
maximum  size  of  the  body  which  can  appear  as  a  unit  on  the 
field  of  battle  without  annihilation  or  ruinous  losses.  (2)  On 
the  range  of  the  human  voice  and  eye  as  further  determining 
the  maximum  limit  of  the  unit  which  one  man  can  directly  con- 
trol in  action.  (3)  On  the  relations  which  these  considerations 
produce  between  different  arms.  The  body  thus  determined 
should  be  the  correct  tactical  unit.  The  number  of  line  officers 
needed  to  command  is  practically  the  same  the  world  over,  and 
called  by  whatever  name  it  may  be,  American  "  battalion," 
German  "company"  or  British  " wing,"  the  limit  to  the  com- 
mand which  can  be  directly  handled  by  one  leader  seems 
placed  by  all  experience  at  near  four  hundred  men.  That 


12  A   WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY. 

the  best  fighting  unit  for  us  is  the  battalion  of  this  size  is 
suggested  by  our  own  experience.  In  the  Civil  War  regiments 
were  handled  as  single  batallions  and  the  best  fighting  on  the 
hottest  fields  was  done  by  these  regiments  dwindled  in  numbers 
to  about  four  hundred  men,  which  is  slightly  greater  than  the 
average  strength  of  Sherman's  infantry  regiments  at  the  end  of 
the  war  (Wagner).  Strong  pressure  for  office,  and  the  greater 
ease  with  which  new  corps  could  be  formed  having  forced  the 
Government  into  raising  troops  in  that  manner  rather  than  by 
keeping  existing  organizations  up  to  strength.* 

The  Roman  centurion  was  captain  of  a  hundred  men.  The 
company — the  command  of  a  captain — is  the  foundation  of  all 
good  armies.  There  the  men  first  learn  obedience  and  subordi- 
nation ;  their  individual  drill  and  guard  duty  ;  how  to  preserve 
health  and  strength  and  take  care  of  themselves ;  how  to  cook 
and  live  as  soldiers.  On  the  books  of  the  company  is  found  the 
military  history  of  the  individual,  the  record  of  the  changes  and 
progress  in  his  soldierly  career,  and  the  data  on  which  is  founded 
his  claim  for  provision  in  impoverished  infirmity  and  old  age. 
The  proper  command  of  this  unit  means  personal  contact  of  the 
commander  with  his  men,  and  such  knowledge  of  their  dispo- 
sitions, habits  and  previous  occupations  as  will  enable  him  to 
place  each  man's  personality  to  the  best  advantage.  This  per- 
sonal knowledge,  essential  to  the  efficiency  of  the  company,  is 
hardly  to  be  had  with  more  than  one  hundred  men,  so  that  the 
natural  division  of  a  battalion  strength  of  four  hundred  should 
seem  to  be  four  companies. 

The  regiment  is  the  military  family.  It  means  home  and 
people  for  the  soldier.  It  is  for  his  daily  life  while  the  battalion 
is  the  organization  under  which  he  faces  the  foe.  The  regiment 
is  determined  by  the  maximum  of  battalions  that  can  be  con- 
trolled as  such,  by  one  leader,  fixed  by  general  experience  at 
three.  In  the  regiment  administrative  and  tactical  considera- 
tions unite  and  it  is  the  most  perfect  unit  of  organization  found 
in  armies.  "  Tactically  it  is  a  necessity  for  a  brigadier-general 
can  easily  command  three  regiments  where  he  would  find  the 
control  of  nine  battalions  a  matter  of  difficulty." 

That  three  infantry  regiments  should  compose  the  brigade  ; 

*See  Appendix  B. 


A    WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY.  13 

three  brigades  making  the  division  and  three  divisions  forming 
the  corps,  in  our  service,  seems  to  pass  unchallenged. 

SKELETON  BATTALIONS. 

The  great  crowning  argument  for  maintaining  commissioned 
strength  for  a  third  more  battalions  than  are  actively  organized 
is  the  provision,  at  trifling  comparative  cost,  of  trained  leaders 
for  the  immediate  addition  to  the  infantry  of  one-third  its  war 
strength  in  case  of  sudden  need.  There  is  no  lack  of  necessity 
for  these  officers  in  time  of  peace.  Every  one  familiar  with  the 
regular  army  knows  the  ever  existing  scarcity  of  officers  with 
troops.  "  Orphan  "  companies  are  not  uncommon  ;  many  have 
but  one  officer  with  them,  but  an  organization  with  its  full  com- 
plement is  so  rare  as  to  excite  comment.  In  June,  1896,  as  rep- 
resentative a  month  as  any,  there  were  on  duty  away  from 
their  regiments,  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven  infantry  officers, 
as  follows : 

Infantry  and  Cavalry  School  thirty-two. 

College  duty  sixty. 

Miscellaneous  thirty-two. 

With  State  troops  seventeen. 

Recruiting  fifteen. 

Military  Academy  twelve. 

Indian  Agents  nine. 

That  is,  the  commissioned  strength  of  eleven  infantry  bat- 
talions is  already  employed  away  from  regiments.  Nothing  can 
be  required  of  the  army  which  in  the  end  will  be  more  remuner- 
ative than  the  duty  of  spreading  military  knowledge  among  the 
people.  From  the  foundation  of  our  government  the  transmis- 
sion of  such  knowledge  has  been  a  question  of  national  impor- 
tance. Not  a  little  of  Southern  success  on  the  earlier  battle-fields 
of  the  Rebellion  was  due  to  Southern  Military  Academies.  One 
hundred  army  officers  are  now  on  duty  at  schools  and  colleges 
throughout  the  country.  In  these  institutions  about  15,000 
students  are  under  drill ;  in  private  schools  half  as  many  more, 
or  over  twenty  thousand  in  all.  Perhaps  half  these  men  leave 
school  yearly  from  various  causes.  Ten  thousand  men  with 
more  or  less  college  education  and  enough  military  training  to 
go  to  war  as  company  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  go 


14  A   WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY. 

into  civil  pursuits  each  year.  By  satisfying  the  demands  for  ad- 
ditional officers  for  such  details  this  number  might  be  doubled. 
There  can  be  no  higher,  holier  duty  than  this  preparation  of 
the  youth  of  the  land  to  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  flag  in  the 
next  hour  of  danger. 

One  of  the  best  uses  of  the  regular  army  is  in  details  with 
State  troops.  In  1895  army  officers  were  on  duty  in  thirty- 
three  States.  In  addition  to  these,  twenty-five  officers  were  de- 
tailed at  the  request  of  governors  to  attend  State  encampments. 
In  two  States  retired  army  officers  fill  the  position  of  Adjutant 
General.  Every  State  and  Territory  ought  to  have  an  army 
officer  regularly  on  duty  and  it  is  thought  the  service  of  one  to 
each  brigade  or  fraction  thereof  could  be  well  utilized.  The 
skeleton  battalion  proposed  would  make  it  possible  to  employ 
officers  to  this  extent  without  crippling  regiments  to  the  injury 
of  the  active  companies.  Unless  there  is  behind  the  army  the 
good  will  of  our  best  citizens  it  cannot  attain  its  highest  useful- 
ness. In  a  way  our  army  must  defer  to  public  opinion.  It 
must  please  the  people ;  it  is  their  army.  Stationed  on  the 
frontier  or  near  the  largest  cities  the  service  is  unfortunate  in 
that  people  know  little  of  it.  Industry,  manliness  and  earnest- 
ness, always  win  friends  among  those  whose  voice  is  said  to  be 
the  voice  of  God.  Not  alone  in  military  lines  must  these  quali- 
ties be  found  but  in  all  proper  efforts  to  popularize  the  army. 
The  voter  must  be  made  to  see,  through  army  officers,  that 
proper  education  of  the  soldier  means  time  and  labor.  In  time 
of  peace  it  is  chiefly  through  these  details  to  impart  military  in- 
struction that  our  officers,  drawn  from  all  walks  in  life,  have  the 
opportunity  to  prove  themselves  worthy  of  confidence,  and  in 
sympathy  with  the  people  from  whence  they  sprang. 

PROMOTION    AND    RETIREMENT. 

u  The  enforced  continuance  in  subordinate  stations  cannot 
fail  to  tell  even  upon  the  best  men.  The  tendency  of  such  a 
system  is  to  make  routine  men,  to  substitute  apathy  and  indo- 
lence for  zeal  and  energy.  Officers  who  grow  old  in  one  grade 
and  without  promotion  are  but  little  encouraged  to  exercise 
their  powers  of  volition.  They  come  to  regard  themselves  as 
part  of  a  machine.  Self-reliance,  resolute  action,  readiness  of 


A   WELL  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY.  15 

resource  and  the  exercise  of  individual  judgment  are  trampled 
out  by  this  stagnation." 

The  experience  of  all  countries  has  demonstrated  the  great 
importance  of  encouraging  hopes  of  preferment  and  reward  in 
the  army.  The  man  who  embraces  the  profession  of  arms  gives 
up  some  of  the  citizen's  most  cherished  rights  and  privileges. 
A  stringent  military  code  hampers  his  freedom  of  speech  and 
liberty  of  person.  His  movements  depend  upon  the  will  of 
others.  These  are  not  small  sacrifices,  yet  the  officer  makes 
them  for  the  interests  of  the  land  under  whose  flag  he  serves. 
In  return  he  hopes  for  rank  and  command.  A  steady,  reason- 
able flow  of  promotion  is  essential  to  the  efficiency  of  an  army. 
An  officer  must  grow  up  to  his  responsibilities.  The  man  who 
walks  a  quarter  of  a  century  in  the  line  of  file  closers  loses  the 
power  of  rising  equal  to  emergencies  encountered  later  in  life. 
It  is  only  through  the  constant  exercise  of  self-dependence  that 
an  officer  becomes  capable  of  real  comand.  A  Royal  Commis- 
sion in  Great  Britain  gave  as  its  opinion  that  the  fact  that  on  an 
average  the  rank  of  captain  was  not  attained  till  past  thirty- 
five  ;  major  till  after  forty-nine,  or  the  command  of  a  regiment 
till  after  the  officer  was  fifty-three,  was  "  destructive  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  army."  The  American  officer  is  not  less  ambitious 
or  deserving  than  officers  of  the  same  blood  beyond  the  seas,  and 
causes  that  militate  against  efficiency  in  the  army  of  England 
may  well  alarm  us  for  our  own.  Sixty-eight  of  our  infantry 
field  officers  are  past  fifty-three,  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven 
captains  are  over  forty-nine,  and  in  June  1896,  two  hundred  and 
one  first  lieutenants  were  beyond  thirty-five.  These  figures 
are  for  the  present — when  these  officers  reach  the  next  grade 
how  old  will  they  be  ?  It  is  believed  that  officers  not  attaining 
a  certain  grade  by  a  determined  age  should  be  retired.  Obvi- 
ously many  thus  retired  would  be  both  physically  and  mentally 
qualified  for  further  service  and  might  take  the  place  of  younger 
officers  on  the  active  list  now  on  duty  away  from  their  com- 
mands. The  employment  of  a  certain  number  of  them  with 
higher  rank  in  the  service  of  the  National  Guard  might  well  be 
made  a  condition  to  the  enjoyment  by  the  several  States  of  ap- 
propriations from  Congress  for  the  benefit  of  the  militia.  In 
case  of  war,  some  of  these  men  would  be  found  able  to  go  to  the 


1 6  A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY. 

front,  and  numbers  of  them  not  fit  to  do  so,  might  take  the  place 
of  the  able-bodied  at  recruiting,  furnishing  officers  for  depot 
battalions  and  similar  duty.  The  beneficial  effect  of  younger 
blood  in  the  infantry,  the  incentive  to  honorable  effort  that 
steady  promotion  would  furnish  cannot  be  questioned.  Against 
it  can  be  urged  only,  that  the  proposition  for  graded  retirement 
is  liable  to  raise  up  enemies  for  an  already  large  retired  list, 
whose  purpose  was  support  to  the  old  and  disabled  officer.  It  is 
true  that  the  retired  list  is  large,  but  it  must  be  remembered 
that  it  by  no  means  represents  the  current  deterioration  of  the 
regular  establishment  of  to-day.  Over  one  hundred  officers  are 
borne  there  by  reasons  of  disabilities  incurred  in  the  volunteer 
service,  and  who  u  thus  represent  a  portion  of  the  wear  and  tear 
of  those  great  armies  whose  rolls  show  four  times  as  many  offi- 
cers as  there  are  souls  all  told  in  our  present  army."  Represent- 
ing too  not  the  ordinary  casualties  of  army  life,  but  the  regular 
army's  share  of  the  living  damage  done  by  the  war. 

RECRUITMENT. 

"  If  we  adopt  the  three  battalion  organization  in  peace  we 
shall  have  to  abandon  it  in  time  of  war  unless  in  connection 
with  it  we  establish  a  depot  and  a  system  of  recruitment  which 
shall  insure  a  steady  supply  of  reserve  troops."  (Upton.)  Speak- 
ing of  our  system  of  recruitment  during  the  war  it  has  been 
said  u  Instead  of  utilizing  the  army's  capital  of  long  service, 
thorough  acquaintance  of  officers  and  soldiers,  memories  of 
labors,  dangers  and  suffering  shared  in  common,  of  dark  and 
bloody  days  of  defeat  manfully  and  patiently  borne,  of  glorious 
scenes  of  victory  rewarding  steadfast  valor  and  unremitting 
energy,  this  the  greater  part  of  the  North  blindly  and  recklessly 
threw  away."  But  one  State  adopted  the  plan  of  keeping  full 
its  veteran  regiments.  All  the  others  as  additional  troops  were 
forwarded  sent  them  as  new  regiments.  They  fell  heir  to  no 
glorious  history.  It  was  not  their  duty  to  maintain  the  honor 
of  an  already  famous  name  or  number.  Officers  and  soldiers 
learned  their  duties  without  the  benefit  of  association  with  ex- 
perienced men  who  knew  them.  The  system  was  unfortunate 
and  wholly  unnecessary.  The  appointment  of  volunteer  officers 
by  governors  was  not  by  any  rights  in  the  case  ;  it  was  simply 


A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY.  17 

permitted.  These  demands  of  politics  must  in  future  be  met  by 
confining  new  appointments  to  personal  staff,  casualties,  etc., 
and  in  as  much  as  possible  we  must  spread  military  education  so 
that  those  obviously  fit  for  commissions  will  largely  make  the 
number  who  claim  office  for  political  reasons.  A  fourth  and 
depot  battalion,  is  in  time  of  war  an  essential  feature  of  the  regi- 
ment with  three  active  battalions.  This  would  be  officered  by 
those  invalided  from  the  front,  and  from  retired  officers  not  able 
to  go  to  war.  Recruits  before  joining  their  regiment  would  re- 
ceive a  course  of  training  in  the  depot  battalion,  which  would 
be  kept  recruited  to  its  maximum  strength.  When  the  regi- 
ment at  the  front  dwindled  to  a  certain  strength,  the  best  trained 
would  be  sent  forward  on  requisition. 

THE  MILITIA. 

The  great  mass  of  the  people  of  our  country  are  quick  in 
their  applause  of  every  act  of  military  valor,  and  faithful  in 
fostering  the  military  spirit.  Alleged  prejudices  against  the  army 
and  other  military  organizations  will  generally  be  found  to  be 
but  the  invention  of  the  low  demagogue.  No  nation  is  more 
ready  than  ours  to  render  homage  to  the  loyal  soldier.  None 
has  paid  more  honor  to  its  military  dead.  None  has  lifted  more 
monuments  in  memory  of  national  defenders.  Our  people  and 
our  military  have  always  been  friends.  For  a  generation  the 
returned  soldier  has  been  a  most  powerful  political  factor.  His 
story  is  inseparable  from  the  growth  and  glory  of  the  nation. 

The  theory  of  our  institutions  is  that  every  adult  male  is 
liable  to  be  needed  at  some  time  as  a  soldier,  and  wise  and 
proper  laws  for  his  enrollment  should  be  enacted.  The  second 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  declares  plainly  that  a  well-reg- 
ulated militia  is  necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free  state.  No 
opinion  adverse  to  this  has  ever  been  voiced  by  any  statesman 
who  has  expressed  an  opinion  upon  it.  And  yet  the  law  on  this 
subject  was  enacted  in  1792,  and  practically  without  change 
still  governs  us,  though  to  take  its  provisions  seriously  would 
make  us  the  laughing  stock  of  the  world.  Probably  99  of  every 
100  citizens  subject  to  enrollment  under  its  provisions  are  un- 
knowingly violating  them. 

The  weapons  it  contemplates  are    in  museums    instead  of 


i8  A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY. 

armories  and  are  valuable  as  curios  and  antiquities,  rather  than 
for  use.  In  imminent  danger  of  invasion  from  foreign  or  Indian 
foes,  the  President  may  call  forth  such  number  of  our  flint- 
locked  powder-horned  and  spontooned  sons  of  Mars  as  may  be 
convenient  to  the  field  of  action  and  may  be  deemed  necessary. 
No  law  of  the  United  States  is  so  generally  disregarded.  No 
recommendations  of  the  various  Presidents  and  Secretaries  have 
been  so  uniformly  unheeded  as  those  urging  remedies  for  defects 
in  the  militia  laws.  No  other  subject  of  such  importance  has 
been  so  unfortunate  in  securing  appropriations  from  Congress. 
No  factor  is  more  unequivocally  declared  as  "necessary  to  the 
security  of  a  free  state  "  than  a  well  regulated  militia.  No  other 
element  can  contribute  as  much  to  the  spread  of  the  military 
spirit,  or  of  military  education.  No  other  source  can  supply 
the  volunteer  forces  in  future  wars  with  such  numbers  of  trained 
soldiers.  On  no  other  subject  has  the  history  of  recent  indus- 
trial disturbances  taught  a  plainer  lesson.  On  no  other  force 
can  we  depend  for  the  all  important  "  first  line  "  under  cover  of 
which  we  may  gain  that  time  which  in  our  next  war  will  be 
the  element  we  will  need  most  and  have  the  least. 

Every  nation  maintains  some  form  of  militia  as  a  reserve  to 
its  standing  army,  and  the  smaller  the  regular  army,  the  more 
important  it  is  that  the  militia  be  thoroughly  organized  and 
trained  to  the  maximum  of  efficiency.  Our  Constitution  dele- 
gates to  Congress  the  power  "  to  provide  for  organizing,  arming 
and  disciplining  the  militia  "  and  reserves  to  the  States  the  ap- 
pointment of  officers  and  the  authority  to  train  the  militia  "  ac- 
cording to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress."  Our  militia 
has  a  duty  both  to  the  States  separately  and  to  the  Federal 
Union.  For  the  former  it  is  a  force  for  the  preservation  of  order 
where  the  civil  authorities  are  not  equal  to  it  or  need  support, 
and  it  is  to  enforce  law  :  for  the  United  States  our  fathers  in- 
tended it  to  be  a  force  trained  as  a  reserve  to  the  regular  army, 
in  emergencies,  and  a  great  school  of  instruction  in  which  the 
youth  of  the  country  should  receive  sufficient  military  training 
to  enable  the  militia  to  act  as  a  feeder  to  armies  raised  for  the 
nation's  defense.  Under  the  provisions  referred  to,  and  to  make 
the  militia  meet  these  requirements,  the  law  of  1792  was  passed, 
and  it  is  the  law  still  in  force.  Its  principal  feature  is  the  en- 


A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY.  19 

rollment  of  all  able-bodied  citizens  between  18  and  45  years  of 
age,  and  the  provision  that  they  shall  arm  and  equip  themselves 
at  their  own  expense.  Later  a  permanent  appropriation  was 
made  to  arm  and  equip  the  militia,  but  the  other  provisions  still 
remain  in  force.  Either  the  National  Guard  of  to-day  is  militia 
in  the  sense  which  brings  them  under  the  Constitutional  pro- 
vision and  therefore  gives  them  this  law  of  1792  as  their  author- 
ity for  existence,  and  their  organizations  must  be  based  upon  it, 
or  they  are  State  standing  armies  and  are  by  the  Constitution 
prohibited.  Aside  from  its  provisions  which  have  been  rendered 
obsolete  and  ridiculous  by  the  lapse  of  time,  the  militia  law  has 
defects  which  have  been  pointed  out  by  every  Administration 
from  Washington  to  McKinley.  Many  of  the  deficiencies  of  the 
law  have  been  supplied  by  the  States  in  their  encouragement  of 
the  National  Guard.  But  the  law  must  be  reconciled  to  the 
changes  time  has  wrought :  to  include  beyond  equivocation  the 
volunteer  guard  as  it  exists  to-day,  and  to  remedy  defects  in  the 
National  Guard  system  which  seems  to  have  "  growed  "  like 
Topsy,  and  which  nevertheless  supports  the  only  representative 
we  have  of  the  militia  of  the  Constitution.  Suitable  legislation 
must  come  from  Congress,  and  the  States  may  be  trusted  to  pass 
laws  necessary  to  utilize  the  appropriations,  allowances,  instruct- 
ors, scholarships,  etc.,  which  the  United  States  may  make  avail- 
able. A  primary  defect  of  the  old  militia  law  is  in  the  excess  of 
numbers  it  holds  to  service.  With  our  vast  and  constantly  in- 
creasing population  active  militia  duty  from  the  whole  body  of 
citizens  between  18  and  45  is  an  unnecessary  burden,  and  a 
proper  division  of  such  citizens  would  be  into  two  classes, — an 
organized  and  an  unorganized  militia.  The  former  to  consist  of 
troops  regularly  volunteering  and  enlisted  and  organized  by  the 
different  States.  This  organized  militia  to  be  subject  to  call  of 
Congress  or  the  President  as  now.  The  unorganized  militia  to 
be  exempt  from  military  duty  to  the  United  States  except  when 
called  into  service  by  special  act  of  Congress.  Notwithstanding 
the  general  assent  to  the  importance  of  the  militia,  the  United 
States  appropriates  less  for  the  militia  than  do  the  several  States. 
And  it  is  a  false  idea  that  the  money  appropriated  for  arming 
and  equipping  the  .  militia  is  money  given  them.  The  United 
States  manufactures  or  buys  war  material,  which,  instead  of  be- 


20  A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY. 

ing  hoarded  in  armories,  is  intrusted  to  the  National  Guard,  and 
while  some  by  "  fair  wear  and  tear  in  public  service  "  become 
unserviceable,  the  remainder  is  still  the  property  of  the  United 
States  and  can  be  utilized  by  it  at  any  time  as  it  sees  fit.  From 
1808  to  1887  the  annual  appropriation  was  $200,000.  Since 
1887  it  has  been  $400,000.  One  State  in  the  Union  alone  ap- 
propriates $447,000  for  its  militia.  There  are  in  round  num- 
bers 112,000  organized  militia  in  the  country,  principally  in- 
fantry. The  money  spent  by  the  United  States  on  arming  and 
equipping  this  force  averages  .about  $3.50  for  each  man,  or 
about  half  enough  to  buy  cartridges  for  his  annual  target  prac- 
tice. This  is  apportioned  among  the  States  according  to  the  num- 
ber of  Senators  and  Representatives  they  have  respectively. 
There  is  nothing  in  such  distribution  to  furnish  an  incentive  to 
raise  and  organize  militia  beyond  one  hundred  men  to  each  Sen- 
ator and  Representative.  As  a  result  the  burden  of  supporting 
them  is  most  unequally  distributed  among  the  States,  some 
raising  many  more  and  others  less  than  their  just  proportion. 
This  same  state  of  affairs  prevailed  in  raising  volunteers.  Five 
States  furnished  three-fifths  of  the  two  and  one-half  millions  of 
men  who  went  to  war  between  1861  and  1865.  New  York,  Penn- 
sylvania and  Ohio  sent  more  soldiers  to  fight  for  the  Union  than 
all  the  rest  of  the  nation  combined.  Ohio  has  more  soldiers' 
widows  and  orphans  than  any  other  half-dozen  States  in  the 
nation.  Why  should  Ohio  this  year  appropriate  $133,000  for 
militia  against  West  Virginia's  $15,000  for  the  same  purpose? 
Or  New  York  appropriate  over  $400,000  and  Arkansas,  Nevada, 
Idaho  and  South  Dakota  not  a  cent  ?  Congress  should  authorize 
the  President  to  order  the  organized  militia  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  for  instruction  for  thirty  days  each  year,  and  the 
whole  amount  of  the  appropriation  for  the  militia  should  be  ap- 
portioned pro  rata  among  the  several  States  and  Territories  and 
the  District  of  Columbia,  according  to  the  number  of  regularly 
commissioned  and  enlisted  and  organized  militia  appearing  for 
muster  into  this  instruction  service.  Other  conditions  to  the 
benefits  of  the  appropriation  should  be  : 

ist.  The  employment  by  the  governors  of  the  respective 
States  of  such  retired  regular  officers  as  the  Secretary  of  War 
may  decide  able  and  fit  for  such  duty  as  officers  of  the  National 


A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY.  21 

Guard  with  one  grade  higher  than  their  retired  rank.  Each 
State  commissioning  its  proportionate  share  and  appropriating 
such  sums  as  with  the  retired  pay  of  these  officers  will  give  them 
the  active  pay  of  the  grade  held  in  the  militia. 

2d.  Each  State  should  require  every  separate  organization 
on  which  its  share  of  the  appropriation  is  based  to  assemble  for 
drill  and  instruction  at  least  twelve  times  each  year,  exclusive 
of  the  time  spent  in  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

3d.  An  annual  inspection  of  each  organization  in  the  State 
should  be  made. 

The  appropriation  for  the  provision  of  arms,  ordnance,  stores, 
signal,  engineer,  subsistence,  medical  and  quartermaster  stores 
and  camp  equipage,  including  such  blank  forms,  regulations  and 
service  manuals  as  are  furnished  the  regular  army,  ought  to  be 
sufficiently  generous  to  make  it  an  object  for  each  State  to  com- 
ply with  the  foregoing  conditions  and  organize  its  militia  to  ob- 
tain the  pro  rata.  It  is  believed  that  this  would  lead  to  the 
military  training  of  about  the  same  proportion  of  citizens  in  each 
State  and  Territory.  President  Washington,  in  1794,  said: 
"  The  devising  and  establishing  of  a  well-regulated  militia  would 
be  a  genuine  source  of  legislative  honor  and  a  perfect  title  to 
public  gratitude."  The  National  Guard  has  met  the  "  devising 
and  establishing  "  phase  of  the  problem,  and  any  national  legis- 
lator who  can  engineer  appropriations  through  Congress  that 
will  foster  and  encourge  this  bulwark  of  our  defense  and  secur- 
ity will  deserve  better  of  his  country  than  all  the  "  watch  dogs  " 
of  the  Treasury  that  have  flourished  since  the  first  Congress  met. 
The  organization  of  the  militia  should  by  Congressional  enact- 
ment be  uniform  and  expansive  and  in  each  State  conform  to 
the  organization  of  the  United  States  regular  establishment. 
Ten  States  now  have  12  companies  to  an  infantry  regiment  (3 
battalion  organization) ;  five  have  10  companies  to  the  regiment, 
and  the  remainder  vary  between  8,  9,  10,  n  and  12.  The  arm- 
ing of  the  militia  should  be  uniform.  Rifles  of  .50  calibre  are 
used  in  some  States,  .45  calibre  in  others,  and  at  least  three 
different  makes  of  rifles  are  in  use.  Organization,  arms,  instruc- 
tion, discipline  and  administration  must  be  uniform  throughout 
before  our  militia  will  reach  its  highest  efficiency. 

The  elective  system  of  officering  the  militia  prevails  in  al- 


22  A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY. 

most  every  State,  and  it  is  believed  to  be  a  great  barrier  to  pro- 
gress. Quite  often  this  election  proves  influence  and  personal 
popularity  rather  than  fitness  and  capacity,  and  the  sooner  this 
system  is  abolished  the  better.  That  it  is  democratic  and  similar 
to  our  institutions  is  true,  but  it  seems  wholly  inconsistent,  and 
irreconcilable  to  the  military  idea.  Appointments  as  far  as 
practicable  should  be  of  men  who  have  attended  military  schools. 
It  is  further  believed  that  the  Constitution  should  be  changed 
to  reserve  to  the  President  the  appointment  of  general  officers  of 
the  militia  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
limiting  such  appointments  to  the  general  officers  and  colonels 
serving  in  the  militia  at  the  time  it  is  mustered  into  service. 
This  would  give  them  date  of  commission  junior  to  regular 
general  officers  with  whom  they  might  serve,  and  prevent 
officers  with  a  lifelong  military  experience  coming  under  the 
command  of  a  possibly  inexperienced  general  deriving  his  posi- 
tion from  political  fortune.  "  It  is  only  by  an  effective  militia 
that  we  can  at  once  enjoy  the  repose  of  peace  and  bid  defiance 
to  foreign  aggression  :  it  is  by  the  militia  that  we  are  constituted 
as  an  armed  nation  standing  in  perpetual  panoply  of  defense,  in 
the  presence  of  all  the  other  nations  of  the  earth." 

INSTRUCTION    OF   OUR   INFANTRY. 

"  The  demands  which  war  makes  upon  the  troops  must 
determine  their  training  in  peace.  The  tasks  of  a  soldier  in 
war  are  simple.  He  must  always  be  able  to  march  and  to  use 
his  weapon.  He  can  only  do  so  as  far  as  his  moral  and  in- 
tellectual qualities  suffice  and  his  bodily  and  military  training 
are  effective.  Moreover,  his  performance  will  only  ba  fully  use- 
ful when  it  is  guided  by  the  will  of  the  leader  and  regulated  by 
discipline." — German  Regulations. 

As  a  preliminary  to  any  joint  instruction  of  the  militia  and 
regular  establishment,  the  annual  Army  Register  should  include 
all  organizations  appearing  yearly  for  muster  in  the  United 
States  service  for  instruction  duty,  just  as  completely  as  it  does 
the  organizations  of  the  regular  establishment,  and  (by  con- 
current legislation  if  necessary)  each  militia  regimental  organiza- 
tion should  for  purposes  of  reports,  returns,  annual  inspections, 
and  the  receipt  of  general  orders,  be  at  all  times  considered  as 


A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY.  23 

part  of  the  command  of  the  Department  commander  within 
whose  territory  it  is  located.  This  at  the  time  of  call  into  the 
United  States  service  for  instruction  or  other  duty  would  at 
once  bring  it  under  the  direct  command  of  such  Department 
commander,  and  as  much  within  the  reach  of  the  regular  staff 
departments,  and  at  the  nation's  disposal  for  rapid  mobilization 
as  any  portion  of  the  regular  establishment.  The  assembling  of 
troops  for  instruction  during  the  proposed  thirty  days'  instruc- 
tion service,  would  be  at  the  judgment  of  the  Department  com- 
manders, under  the  War  Department,  limited  then,  as  now,  with 
the  regular  troops,  by  the  amount  of  money  which  Congress  in 
its  wisdom  thinks  such  insurance  against  military  disaster  is 
worth.  It  is  believed,  no  matter  how  unpopular  the  suggestion, 
that  an  essential  to  the  smooth  working  of  any  joint  instruction 
will  be  the  calling  of  no  militia  man  higher  than  colonel  into  the 
service,  or  as  before  suggested,  empowering  the  President  to  ap- 
point general  officers  of  the  militia  when  mustered  into  the 
United  States  service.  It  should  be  remembered,  that  as  the 
nation  is  to  be  the  gainer  by  this  joint  instruction,  upon  it  will 
fall  the  expense  of  transporting  and  subsisting  the  troops  on 
such  duty  and  of  paying  the  militia  at  such  rates  that  thirty 
days'  interruption  to  their  regular  occupations  will  not  drive  all 
good  men  out  of  the  militia. 

Each  regularly  organized  brigade  of  militia  upon  request 
through  the  governor  of  its  State  should  have  detailed  upon  the 
staff  of  its  brigadier,  a  United  States  officer,  to  be  at  the  discre- 
tion of  the  governor  commissioned  in  the  militia  with,  during 
his  tour,  such  rank  as  the  governor  may  deem  proper.  (Such 
appointments  not  to  be  considered  a  violation  of  R.  S.  1222.) 

Each  State  and  Territory  should  be  allowed  to  detail  at  the 
service  schools  with  each  army  class  that  enters  any  number  of 
qualified  militia  lieutenants  that  it  may  care  to  maintain  on  such 
pay  and  allowances  as  will  permit  them  to  accept  the  details. 

It  is  not  proposed  to  outline  a  course  of  instruction  to  be 
followed  at  any  joint  assembling  of  regulars  and  militia.  It  is 
thought,  however,  that  other  occasions  should  have  imparted 
skill  in  all  ordinary  drills  for  bodies  smaller  than  a  regiment, 
and  that  this  period  might  be  devoted  to  drills,  exercises  and 
manoeuvres  where  larger  bodies  are  necessary.  The  permanency 


24  A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY. 

of  location  of  the  militia,  and  their  annual  assembling  in  the 
same  department  would  seem  to  suggest  that  the  instruction 
should  be  progressive  from  year  to  year,  remembering  that  "  it 
is  of  immense  importance  that  the  soldier,  high  or  low,  whatever 
rank  he  has,  should  not  have  to  encounter  for  the  first  time  in 
war,  those  things  which  when  seen  for  the  first  time  set  him  in 
astonishment  and  perplexity  "  and  that  while  "  steadiness  under 
fire  and  calmness  when  threatened  by  danger  cannot  be  acquired 
by  manoeuvres  with  imaginary  enemies,  almost  every  other  virtue 
which  a  soldier  should  possess  can  be  developed  in  time  of 
peace." 


The  final  responsibility  for  our  infantry  and  other  forces,  their 
fitness  for  battle  in  organization  and  training,  for  their  lack  of  it 
which  one  day  may  mean  insult  and  humiliation  for  the  best  flag 
that  floats,  rests  on  those  charged  with  the  affairs  of  the  Govern- 
ment. The  problem  should  not  be  held  in  abeyance  till  the 
emergency  arises.  The  strongest  nation  of  giants  suddenly 
aroused  from  slumber,  unarmed  and  lethargic  could  not  with- 
stand the  attack  of  the  smallest  army  of  Davids  :  "  American  lib- 
erty does  not  require  that*  we  live  in  a  republic  crippled  in 
powers  or  endangered  by  humiliating  weakness." 


APPENDIX  A. 

HISTORICAL   EXTRACTS    SHOWING  WHERE    HOSTILITIES   BEGAN 

WITHOUT   DECLARATIONS   OF   WAR.       1800-1896. 

Taken  from  Mr.  Cutting' s  Report  to  accompany  H.  R.  7318 ,  to  $2d 

Congress,  ist  Session. 

On  September  5,  1800,  Russia  seized  two  British  ships  in 
Russian  ports  and  sent  their  crews  prisoners  into  the  interior 
without  declaration  of  war. 

On  July  14,  1801,  reprisals  were  ordered  by  the  English 
Cabinet.  All  Swedish,  Denmark,  and  Russian  vessels  in  English 
ports  were  seized  and  a  large  English  fleet  under  Sir  Hyde 
Parker  was  dispatched  to  the  Baltic,  although  there  was  no 
declaration  of  war. 


A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY.  25 

On  March  2oth  the  Swedish  inland  steamer  Bartholomew, 
wholly  unprepared  for  any  defense,  surrendered  at  the  first  sum- 
mons to  a  force  of  three  regiments  of  foot  and  a  detachment  of 
artillery  under  Lieut.  Gen.  Trigge  and  a  squadron  under  Rear- 
Admiral  Duckworth. 

'  In  1802  Napoleon   sent  a  force  of  20,000  men   into  friendly 
Switzerland  and  seized  by  surprises   Soleure,  Zurich  and  Berne. 

On  November  23,  1806,  the  Russian  army,  during  negotia- 
tion and  after  full  concessions,  suddenly  invaded  Moldavia  and 
seized  Chotsim,  Bender  and  Jassai. 

In  1806  England  sent  an  expedition  against  Curagoa ;  her 
fleet  suddenly  entered  the  harbor,  and  Fort  Amsterdam  was 
assaulted  and  captured. 

On  March  6,  1807,  England  sent  an  expedition,  during 
negotiations,  into  Egypt,  and  on  the  2ist  of  March  the  Governor 
of  Alexandria  accepted  terms  of  capitulation. 

In  1807  the  English  man-of-war  Leopard,  52  guns,  demanded 
of  the  Chesapeake,  an  American  frigate  cruising  off  Virginia, 
the  requisition  of  some  English  deserters  on  board  the  Chesa- 
peake. The  American  captain  denied  the  right  of  search,  where- 
upon the  Leopard  fired  a  broadside,  Jailing  and  wounding  sev- 
eral Americans  in  time  of  peace. 

In  1812,  Napoleon  by  sudden  attack  on  troops  of  Kowno, 
declared  war  with  Russia. 

On  June  18,  1812,  the  United  States  declared  war  against 
Great  Britain.  During  the  month  of  April  previous,  however, 
a  general  embargo  was  laid  by  Congress  upon  all  vessels  in  the 
harbors  of  the  United  States  for  seventy  days. 

In  1815  Mural,  King  of  Naples,  attacked  Austria  without 
notice. 

In  1816  Portugal  invaded  the  Spanish  possessions  on  the 
river  Plate  without  explanation  or  previous  declaration. 

In  1818  the  United  States,  during  peace  with  Spain  seized 
Pensacola  and  St  Mark's. 

In  1821  the  United  States  seized  a  French  ship  during  time 
of  peace. 

In  1826  the  King  of  Spain  carried  on  hostilities  against  Por- 
tugal with  willful  falsehood,  without  declaring  war,  but  pro- 
fessing friendship. 


26  A    WELL    ORGANIZED   INFANTRY. 

During  the  same  year  England,  without  declaration  of  war 
on  Spain,  dispatched  troops  to  fight  the  Spaniards. 

In  1827  tne  Turkish  fleet  was  destroyed  by  Russia,  England, 
and  France  without  warning  of  war. 

In  1828  the  Russo-Turkish  War  occurred.  Hostilities  on 
both  sides  preceded  declaration  of  war. 

In  the  same  year  France  sent  an  expedition  against  the 
Turks  in  Greece  and  captured  five  fortresses. 

In  1831,  without  declaration  of  war,  Russia  fired  into,  sank, 
and  captured  Greek  ships  and  joined  in  a  formal  attack  upon 
Poros. 

During  this  same  year  a  French  admiral  carried  off  the  whole 
Portuguese  fleet  and  converted  reprisals  into  war.  And  the 
King  of  Holland  pressed  his  troops  into  Belgium  and  in  nine 
days  crushed  the  Belgian  forces. 

On  February  22,  1832,  France  sent  a  squadron  with  troops 
and  captured  Ancona  by  sudden  surprise  during  absolute  peace 
between  France  and  Rome. 

In  1834  the  Spanish  army,  without  notice,  crossed  the  Por- 
tuguese frontier,  and,  by  a  forced  march,  surprised  and  defeated 
the  force  under  Don  Carlos. 

In  1835  the  inhabitants  of  Texas  raised  the  standard  of 
revolt  against  the  Mexican  government,  and  declared  them- 
selves independent. 

During  the  year  1838  an  invasion  of  Canada  took  place 
under  circumstances  described  in  the  United  States  Congress  as 
such  "  that  the  people  were  at  war  while  their  governments 
were  at  peace." 

On  the  i  yth  of  April,  1840,  the  British  ships  of  war  in  the 
vicinity  of  Naples  commenced  hostilities  and  captured  a  num- 
ber of  Neapolitan  vessels,  and  an  embargo  was  laid  on  all  ports 
of  Malta  that  bore  the  Sicilian  flag. 

In  1844  hostilities  by  France  against  Morocco  commenced 
by  Prince  de  Joinville  on  not  receiving  a  satisfactory  answer  to 
an  ultimatum. 

On  May  13,  1846,  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
passed  a  resolution  that,  by  virtue  of  the  constitutional  authority 
vested  in  them,  declared  that  a  state  of  war  existed  between 
the  Republic  of  Mexico  and  the  United  States.  The  President 


A  WELL  ORGANIZED*  INFAN;FKK--  -:    27 

in   his  message  recited   many  and    various  acts  of    hostilities 
prior  to  any  declaration  of  war. 

In  1847  a  revolutionary  junta  had  been  established  in  Por- 
tugal and  was  carrying  on  a  war  against  the  queen.  The  war 
having  dragged  on  for  some  time,  England,  France  and  Spain 
agreed  to  interfere,  but  no  declaration  of  war  was  made. 

In  1848  the  Italian  insurrectionary  war  broke  out ;  the  King 
of  Piedmont  at  once  joined  his  armies  to  those  of  the  Italians, 
and  the  war  from  its  nature,  was  carried  on  without  any  formal 
notice. 

On  April  25,  1849,  tne  French  General  Oudinot  entered 
citadel  Civita  Vecchia.  The  Roman  Assembly  protested  in 
the  name  of  God  and  the  people  against  this  unexpected  inva- 
sion. A  short  time  after  there  followed  the  siege  and  capture 
of  Rome. 

In  1850  and  1851  the  United  States  waged  the  "unofficial " 
war  against  Cuba. 

In  1853  anc^  J854  the  Crimean  War  was  raged.  Hostilities 
preceded  war  as  follows  :  The  Russian  Government  seized  the 
Danubian  Principalities. 

On  May  31  the  order  for  the  passage  of  the  Pruth  was 
passed. 

On  June  2,  before  it  was  known  in  London,  orders  were 
sent  to  English  and  French  Admirals  to  move  up  the  Besike 
Bay. 

On  October  22  the  English  and  French  fleet,  under  orders 
from  London  and  Paris,  entered  the  Dardanelles  in  express 
breach  of  treaty 'of  1841. 

On  October  23  Turkey  declared  war  upon  Russia  and 
crossed  the  Danube  to  expel  the  Russians. 

In  1859,  France  and  Italy  against  Austria.  The  Austrian 
government  alleged  that  the  actual  commencement  of  this  war 
was  on  both  sides  (as  between  France  and  Austria)  declared  to 
be  due  to  prior  hostile  acts,  not  words. 

On  May  5,  1860,  Garibaldi  sailed  from  Genoa  with  2000 
troops  to  wrest  Sicily  from  the  King  of  Naples. 

In  1863  war  between  Austria  and  Prussia  on  one  side  and 
Denmark  on  the  other  virtually  commenced  by  the  occupation 


28 


/;..  ORGANIZED  INFANTRY. 


of    Holstein  and   Lauenburg   by   the  troops  of  the  two  great 
powers. 

In  1870,  the  war  between  France  and  Germany,  the  declara- 
tion of  war  clearly  preceded  war. 

DURATION    OF    RECENT    WARS. 

Taken  from   a  lecture  delivered  by  Captain  D.  M.    Taylor,  Ordnance 
Department,    U,   S.   Army,   at  San  Francisco  in  1885. 


Year. 

War. 

Declared. 

Decisive  Battle. 

Days. 

rSro 

France  and  \ustria 

Aluv   \ 

Solferino,  June  24  

52 

J05V-  •  •  • 

1864 

Dano-German  

.  .  Jan.  16  .  .  . 

Fall  of  Duppel,  April    iS.  .  . 

93 

1866 

\ustro-Prussian 

June  1  6 

Sadowa,  Julv  ^  

17 

1866 

Time  20 

Ljssa    Julv  20 

^o 

1870  

Franco-German  

..July  15.... 

1 

Sedan,  September  2  

49 

APPENDIX  B. 

Taken  from  a  paper  by  Colonel  H.  L.   Turner,  ist  Regiment  Illinois 

National  Guard. 

The  campaigns  of  1894  have  convinced  the  First  Regiment 
that  for  field  service  the  three  battalion  organization  is  an  im- 
mense improvement  over  the  old  eight  and  ten  company  forma- 
,tions.  During  the  entire  summer's  service  the  battalion  was 
treated  as  the  unit  and  its  commander  held  responsible  for  the 
proper  execution  of  all  orders  by  every  portion  of  his  force — for 
its  discipline  and  for  the  safety  of  the  territory  covered  by  it. 
As  the  major  was  rigidly  held  to  a  strict  and  wide  responsibility, 
he  was  given  a  commensurate  authority.  The  regimental  com- 
mander refrained  carefully  from  direct  dealings  with  company 
commanders,  and  permitted  the  majors  to  issue  written  orders 
as  battalion  commanders,  in  execution  of  regimental  orders. 

The  utmost  effort  was  put  forth  by  the  colonel  to  maintain 
such  distribution  of  the  troops  that  each  battalion  should  remain 
intact,  its  companies  covering  contiguous  territory.  In  a 
thousand  ways  this  policy  worked  to  the  advantage  of  the  ser- 
vice, and  in  two  or  three  isolated  cases  wherein  the  command- 
ing officer  broke  his  own  rule  and  meddled  with  the  major's 
work  he  made  a  mess  of  it. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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